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Assume that ordinary agents have some epistemically justified substantive evaluative 
beliefs,
1
 e.g., Katherine justifiably believes that Trump’s comments about immigration were 
wrong, Umut justifiably believes that the pianist’s performance was admirable, etc. Given 
this assumption, we face a further question: how can ordinary agents come to possess 
justified substantive evaluative beliefs?  
Recently there has been interest in the following answer:
2
  
Epistemic Sentimentalism: emotions are a source of immediate prima facie 
propositional justification for evaluative beliefs; emotions sometimes constitute the 
justificatory basis for undefeated doxastically justified evaluative beliefs.
3
  
According to Epistemic Sentimentalism (hereafter ‘Sentimentalism’), an emotion like guilt, 
for instance, can provide prima facie propositional justification, sufficient in the absence of 
defeaters to make it epistemically permissible to believe that, e.g., my having lied to my 
partner was wrong, independently of having justification for believing other supporting 
propositions, e.g., that lying is pro tanto wrong. Further, guilt (for example), may sometimes 
constitute the justificatory basis of evaluative beliefs. Finally, Sentimentalism claims that 
emotions are a source of immediate justification. That doesn’t entail, but nor does it preclude, 
the stronger view that emotions are the source of immediate justification. 
Sentimentalism is motivated by the following considerations. Firstly, for there to be justified 
substantive evaluative beliefs, this plausibly requires something akin to experiential 
‘evaluative data’, in a similar way to that allegedly provided by sensory experience vis-à-vis 
empirical beliefs. Second, Sentimentalism is motivated by a commitment to Perceptualism 
about the emotions. On this view, conscious and occurrent emotions are, or are best 
understood by analogy with, perceptual experiences, e.g., like perceptual experiences they are 
                                                          
1
 I’m understanding ‘epistemically justified’ in the following way: S possessing an epistemically justified belief 
that p can be understood either as (i) S believing p and there being the absence of a non-moral or non-prudential 
obligation on S not to believe that p, or, (ii) S believing p on the basis of something that makes probable the 
belief that p. By ‘substantive’ I mean something like ‘non-formal’. See Cowan, R. (2017) “Rossian Conceptual 
Intuitionism”, Ethics, for a fuller discussion of substantivity. Finally, I’m understanding ‘evaluative’ very 
broadly so as to encompass beliefs about deontic and value properties.  
2
 See, e.g., Döring, S. (2003); Pelser, A.C., (2014). Note that in my (2016) I label this view ‘Epistemic 
Perceptualism’. I’ve come to think that ‘Epistemic Sentimentalism’ is a more informative and specific label, and 
thus preferable. 
3
 Moral sense theorists like Frances Hutcheson can be interpreted as endorsing Epistemic Sentimentalism. 
intentional, non-doxastic, and possess phenomenal character.
4
Endorsing Perceptualism 
provides some reason for exploring Sentimentalism’s prospects, i.e., if emotions are 
perceptual perhaps they have a perceptual epistemology (there is, however, no entailment). 
Finally, the idea that emotion can be revelatory of evaluative features – which 
Sentimentalism precisifies – has support in everyday thinking (and coheres with the alleged 
intentionality of emotion). For example, it is plausible that remorse can sometimes be the way 
in which we realise the moral import of our actions, while indignation at the judge’s ruling 
might reveal to its subject how unjust it is. If that’s right, then perhaps subjects gain justified 
evaluative beliefs via their emotions.  
Sentimentalism is attractive. Firstly, it promises a way of halting the epistemic regress for 
evaluative beliefs, i.e., it identifies a source of evaluative justification that is not itself in need 
of justification. This will, of course, only be of interest to those who think epistemic 
justification is linear. The second attraction is broader in scope: if one thinks that we need 
something akin to experiential evaluative data to get justified substantive evaluative beliefs, 
then Sentimentalism potentially provides a naturalist-friendly account that doesn’t require an 




Sentimentalism is, however, apparently vulnerable to serious objections. Perhaps emotions 
are too unreliable for it to be true.
6
 Or maybe Epistemic Sentimentalism clashes with an 
attractive analysis in the metaphysics of value: Neo-Sentimentalism.
7
 In this paper I’m setting 
these (and other objections
8
) aside and instead focus on a family of objections that all take as 
a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical 
to Sentimentalism: epistemic reason-responsiveness.
9
 Epistemic reason-responsiveness 
                                                          
4
 There are various reasons for adopting Perceptualism which I don’t have space to go into. Note that Döring 
(2003) and (2007) partially identifies Perceptualism with Sentimentalism, i.e., emotions are analogous to 
perceptual experiences in virtue of their normative properties. This complication shouldn’t make a difference to 
my discussion – but the reader should note that, as I’m characterising it, the views are distinct. 
5
 Oddie, G. (2005) argues that desires play a similar epistemic role vis-à-vis judgments about goodness to that 
afforded to emotions by Sentimentalism. The reader is invited to consider how my arguments impact on Oddie’s 
view.  
6
 But see Pelser, A. (2014) for a response. 
7
 See, e.g., Brady, M.S. (2013). But see my (2016) for a reply. 
8
 See, for example, the objection from Brady, M.S. (2013) that proponents of Sentimentalism misidentify the 
primary goal of evaluative thinking as epistemic justification or knowledge, when it is actually evaluative 
understanding. 
9
 See, e.g. Brady, M. (2013); Deonna, J. & Teroni, F., (2012); Salmela, M., (2011) “Can Emotion Be Modelled 
On Perception?” dialectica 65 (1):1-29; Vance, J. (2014). Both Brady and Deonna and Teroni discuss explicitly 
the Neo-Sentimentalist claim that evaluative properties can be analysed in terms of appropriate or fitting 
emotional responses. In my view this neither entails nor is entailed by the claim that emotions are epistemically 
(hereafter ‘reason-responsiveness’) can be thought of as encompassing two interconnected 
claims: firstly, emotions can be held or undergone for epistemic reasons, e.g., my guilt might 
be based upon a belief that I have lied to my partner, where this constitutes an evidential base 
for my guilt. If an emotion is based upon defective evidence, e.g., my belief that I have lied to 
my partner is unjustified, then the emotion is itself in some way epistemically defective, e.g., 
perhaps my guilt is also unjustified. Second, emotions are mental items for which epistemic 
justifications can be given/demanded, e.g., if I’m feeling guilty, it’s perfectly legitimate for 
someone to ask me to provide a reason for my guilt – e.g. ‘why are you feeling that way?’10 – 
where this is an appeal for epistemic reasons or evidence. 
Given reason-responsiveness, it is apparently possible to develop powerful objections against 
Sentimentalism. First, the reason-responsiveness of emotions may appear to entail the falsity 
of Perceptualism, since perceptual experiences aren’t reason-responsive: it apparently makes 
little sense to pose justificatory why-questions about perceptual experiences, e.g., “why are 
you having that experience?”, and experiences don’t seem to be held or undergone for 
epistemic reasons. Experiences stand beyond epistemic justification.
1112
Given the seemingly 
reasonable assumption that Sentimentalism depends on Perceptualism then Sentimentalism is 
false. Call this the ‘Experiences Aren’t Reason-Responsive’ Objection.  
Second, if emotions have evidential bases, e.g., a belief that I have lied to you, then emotions 
are epistemically dependent, i.e., they justify evaluative beliefs only if (and partly because) 
their bases are justified or justification-conferring. Given this, it is difficult to see how 
emotions could play an immediate justifying role, i.e., epistemic dependence and epistemic 
immediacy seem incompatible. Call this the ‘Epistemic Dependence’ Objection. 
Finally, it is implausible that a mental item could be a source of immediate justification – i.e., 
it can generate justification for reason-responsive states such as beliefs – while being itself 
reason-responsive. This is because this combination – being generative of justification and 
reason-responsive – would seem to entail that such a mental item could justify itself, which is 
highly dubious. Call this the ‘Self-Justification’ Objection. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reason-responsive. However, I suspect that, e.g., Brady, thinks that emotions are also epistemically reason-
responsive. 
10
 Deonna and Teroni (2012), p. 69 
11
 Thanks to David Chalmers for highlighting this line of objection to me. 
12
 Sceptics might pose why questions which are aimed at undermining the trust that we put in perceptual 
experience, e.g., “why do you think that the world is the way your experience presents it?” etc. But that is a 
different matter from the one under consideration, i.e. whether one can ask for a justification for an experience. 
It might seem that the natural way to respond to these objections is to argue against emotional 
reason-responsiveness, e.g., perhaps why-questions are merely causal or clarificatory 
questions. I here adopt a different approach. I respond to these objections whilst granting that 
emotions are reason-responsive.
13
This is not only dialectically significant vis-à-vis the 
prospects for Sentimentalism, but also supports a broader claim about the compatibility of a 
mental item’s being reason-responsive and its being a generative14 source of epistemic 
justification. In §1 I clarify Perceptualism and Sentimentalism. In §2-§5 I respond to the 
reason-responsiveness objections. In §6 I conclude.  
1. Perceptualism and Epistemic Sentimentalism 
There’s a reasonable degree of consensus among contemporary philosophers of emotion that 
paradigm cases of emotions, e.g., guilt in response to infidelity, implicate the following 
elements: (i) a representation of some target object or event, e.g., a belief that I have lied to 
my partner; (ii) an evaluation of that target object or event, e.g., that my lying was wrong; 
(iii) a motivation to act which is intelligible in light of the representation and evaluation, e.g., 
to apologise or make reparations to my partner; (iv) affective phenomenology, e.g., an 
unpleasant ‘yucky’ feeling, and, (v) bodily changes (and perhaps an awareness thereof), e.g., 
a lump in one’s throat, dry mouth, etc.15 
Disagreement emerges when we theorise about which of these elements are constitutive of 
emotions, which are mere eliciting causes and effects, and what the nature is of the 
component parts and their relations.  
Perceptualists think that conscious and occurrent emotions are, or are best understood by 
analogy with, perceptual experiences. More specifically, Perceptualism can be understood as 
providing an account of the evaluative element in emotion (component (ii)): it’s a perceptual 
experience, or is in some respects like a perceptual experience, with evaluative content. For 
                                                          
13
 My strategy vis-à-vis Sentimentalism is similar to the approach adopted by Perceptualists to show that the 
seeming irrationality of recalcitrant emotions (e.g., fear in the face of knowledge that there is no danger) is 
compatible with their being experiences. See, e.g., Brady, M. (2009) ‘The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions’ 
Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430; Tappolet, C. (2012), ‘Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions’. 
In Clotilde, C. (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan. For an 
attempt to explain away the claim that recalcitrant emotions are irrational see Döring, S. (2015) ‘What’s Wrong 
with Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity’, dialectica 69 (3):381-402. I 
regard the issue of emotional recalcitrance as distinct from – though related to – epistemic reason-
responsiveness. 
14
 The reader can assume that generative and immediate justification are equivalent. I will, however, argue that 
these come apart. 
15
 This is indebted to remarks made in Brady (2013); Deonna and Teroni (2012). 
example, a proponent might claim that fear is, or involves, a perceptual experience of 
dangerousness, guilt an experience of wrongness, and so on.  
There are various ways in which Perceptualism could be developed, e.g., whether the 
affective component constitutes the evaluative component,
16
 or whether we include 
component (i) the “cognitive base”17 as part of the emotion, etc. I’m agnostic about which 
version of Perceptualism is most plausible (note that this includes my being open to the 
possibility that different versions are plausible for different types of emotions). However, 
depending on which version we adopt, this will make Sentimentalism more-or-less vulnerable 
to objections, including reason-responsiveness objections. As it happens, I think that versions 
of Perceptualism which claim that component (i) is not part of the emotion and that 
component (ii) a sort of affective seeming state with conceptual content (which is part of the 
emotion but distinct from other components) will be the most vulnerable to reason-
responsiveness objections.
18 19
 I’ll tentatively assume this in what follows. 
Sentimentalists claim that emotions are a source of immediate justification for evaluative 
beliefs and sometimes constitute the immediate justificatory basis of evaluative beliefs.20 
Sentimentalism can take two general forms: Reliabilism and Phenomenalism.  
Reliabilists think that a subject, S, has immediate prima facie propositional (perceptual) 
justification for believing that p iff S has (i) an experience with an appropriate content, e.g., 
p, and, (ii) the experience is produced by a reliable process.21 On this view, an emotion can 
constitute the evidential ground or basis for an evaluative belief, but does so in virtue of a 
non-evidential property of emotions: their being produced by a reliable process, i.e., one 
which issues in a favourable ratio of veridical to non-veridical states. 
Phenomenalists think that a subject, S, has immediate prima facie propositional (perceptual) 
justification for believing that p iff S has an experience with presentational phenomenal 
character with respect to p. On this view, emotions constitute the evidential base for 
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 See, e.g., Doring, S. (2003); Goldie, P. (2000), The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford 
University Press 
17
 Deonna, J. and Teroni, F. (2012). 
18
 Indeed, without the assumption of conceptual content, one might wonder whether it is plausible to claim that 
they are reason-responsive in the first place – but see Corns, J. ‘Hedonic Rationality’ (unpublished MS) for the 
view that hedonics can be reason-responsive. 
19
 For a version of Perceptualism along these lines see Roberts, R.C. (2003), Emotions: An Essay in Aid of 
Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press. 
20
 Some proponents, e.g., Döring, S. (2003), talk of non-inferential justification. Others, e.g., Pelser, A.C. 
(2014), refer to basic justification. I assume that these are equivalent to immediate justification. See, e.g., Pryor, 
J., (2005) “There is Immediate Justification”. In Steup, M. & Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology, Blackwell, 181—202 
21
 Brady (2013) assumes Reliabilism. 
evaluative beliefs in virtue of their presentational phenomenology. ‘Presentational’ character 
with respect to p apparently differs significantly from representational content found in a 
belief or judgment that p, e.g., compare visually perceiving the red postbox at the end of the 
road with judging that the postbox at the end of the road is red. Although there are competing 
accounts of presentational phenomenology with respect to p
22
, it can be roughly understood 
as it seeming that p, where this involves the feeling that one is being told that something is 
true, as opposed to asserting that it is true. It is also typically associated with passivity and 
(importantly), a lack of reason-responsiveness.  
I’m ecumenical about these epistemological views, but I suggest that the reader assume the 
version of Sentimentalism that they take to be most vulnerable to the various reason-
responsiveness objections. I now proceed to those objections and my responses. 
2. Experiences Aren’t Reason-Responsive 
The Experiences Aren’t Reason-Responsive Objection goes as follows: 
 P1: Emotions are epistemically reason-responsive. 
 P2: No perceptual experiences are epistemically reason-responsive. 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C1: Emotions are not perceptual experiences. 
 P3: Epistemic Sentimentalism is true only if emotions are perceptual experiences. 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 C2: Epistemic Sentimentalism is false. 
P1 encompasses the claim, already explained in the introduction, that emotions can be held 
for epistemic reasons and that justifications can be demanded or given for emotions.  
P2 expresses a standard view about the nature of perceptual experience. On this view, 
perceptual experiences – and this is usually thought to include seeming states23 – just aren’t 
the sort of things which can be epistemically based upon other mental items such as beliefs,
24
 
or for which justificatory why questions can be sensibly asked. It arguably doesn’t make 
sense to think that a subject could be experiencing the redness of an object on the basis of 
further evidence that they have about the object. Similarly, asking someone for a justification 
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 See Chudnoff, E. (2013) and Reiland, I. (2015) for examples. 
23
 Although note that those who countenance the existence of seemings think that they are distinct from 
sensations. See papers in Tucker, C. (2013) for discussion. 
24
 See, e.g., Lyons, J. (2011).  
for having the experience of redness would strike us as odd. Indeed, we might think that 
possession of these features (or perhaps it is the lack of features) is partly constitutive of 
being a perceptual experience. 
P3 hinges on the claim that it is only perceptual experiences that possess/lack features which 
enable them to confer immediate justification for beliefs. Importantly for our purposes this 
allegedly includes their lacking the feature of epistemic reason-responsiveness. Here is Sosa 
expressing something like this thought: 
Experiences are able to provide justification that is foundational because they lie 
beyond justification and unjustification. Since they are passively received, they cannot 
manifest obedience to anything, including rational norms, whether epistemic or 




If that’s right, then emotions will be capable of conferring immediate or generative 
justification only if they are perceptual experiences. Hence, Sentimentalism hinges on the 
truth of Perceptualism. Given the intermediate conclusion that Perceptualism is false (from 
P1 and P2), Sentimentalism is also false. 
Since I am granting P1 (reason-responsiveness), in order to defend Sentimentalism I must 
deny either P2 or P3. I’ll first briefly explain how P2 is controversial and can plausibly be 
resisted. I’ll then outline how P3 can be denied. However, as will become clear, a plausible 
denial of P3 requires dealing with further reason-responsiveness objections. 
One option open to Sentimentalists is to deny P2 by identifying cases of non-emotional 
perceptual experiences which seem to be reason-responsive. The most plausible candidates of 
this are, I think, cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences. Roughly, cognitive 
penetration of (sensory) perceptual experience is possible if and only if it’s possible for two 
subjects to have experiences which differ in content and/or phenomenal character, where this 
difference is the result of a causal process that traces more or less directly to states in the 
subjects’ cognitive system, and where we hold fixed the perceptual stimuli, the condition of 
the subjects’ sensory organs, the environmental conditions, and, the attentional focus of the 
subjects.
26
 Putative cases of cognitive penetration include: beliefs about the typical colour of 
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 Sosa, E. (2007) Virtue Epistemology, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 46:   
26
 See Vance, J. (2014). 
bananas can allegedly make subjects experience them as being more yellow than they are; 
possessing a stock of beliefs about pine trees may enable perceivers to have visual 
experiences which represent the property of being a pine tree in a way that novices do not. 
Why would anyone think that cognitively penetrated experiences are epistemically reason-
responsive? Although this matter is highly contentious, some philosophers
27
 think that 
attributing something like the property of reason-responsiveness to at least some cognitively 
penetrated experiences can best explain our intuitions about the epistemological features of 
beliefs based upon such experiences. To get a sense of what is meant by this, consider the 
following case: 
Wishful Willy: Willy is a gold prospector but hasn’t yet become an expert at 
identifying gold nuggets, e.g., he isn’t yet able to distinguish them from yellowish 
pebbles. Nevertheless, Willy also has a very strong wish to find gold. Indeed, his wish 
is so powerful that when he observes a yellowish pebble (and has a seeming that there 
is a yellowish pebble) his desire cognitively penetrates his seeming such that it comes 
to seem to him to be a gold nugget.
28
  
About this case, consider the following question: would Willy’s belief that there is a gold 
nugget be epistemically justified? The intuitive verdict, I think, is ‘No’. Yet, Willy had an 
experience with this content, and there aren’t any obvious defeaters for his belief. At this 
point, the appeal to reason-responsiveness comes in. For example, Matthew McGrath
29
 
suggests that in order to explain the verdict about Wishful Willy, we ought to say that Willy’s 
seeming that there is a gold nugget is a special kind of seeming (he calls it a ‘non-receptive’ 
seeming, in contrast to more basic ‘receptive’ seemings). Thanks to his strong desire for gold, 
Willy quasi-infers the seeming that there is a gold nugget on the basis of his receptive 
seeming that there is a yellowish pebble. About quasi-inference, McGrath says the following: 
Let us say that a transition from a seeming that P to a seeming that Q is “quasi-
inferential” just in case the transition that would results from replacing these seemings 
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 See, e.g., Siegel (2012); McGrath, M., (2013) ‘Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the Bad 
Basis Counterexamples’ in C. Tucker (ed) Seemings and Justification, Oxford University Press. 
28
 This is adapted from a case in Markie, P. (2006) “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief”, Nous 40: 
118-42 
29
 McGrath, M. (2013). 
30
 McGrath, M. (2013), p. 237 
Applied to the Wishful Willy case, the thought is that the relation between the non-receptive 
seeming of a gold nugget and the receptive seeming of a yellowish pebble is similar to the 
relation between two beliefs, where one is inferred from the other. As McGrath characterises 
this, quasi-inferred seemings  
function epistemically in the way inference by the person does: they can at best 
transmit the relevant epistemic property of the inputs to the outputs; they cannot 
generate this property for the outputs when it isn’t possessed by the inputs.31 
A quasi-inferred seeming can fail to confer epistemic justification in two ways: (1) if the 
quasi-inference isn’t a good one for the subject, i.e., if the content of the input seeming 
doesn’t sufficiently support the content of the output for the subject, and, (2) if the input 
seeming isn’t justification-conferring. Finally, note that McGrath also allows that there can be 
seemings that are based upon beliefs. 
Back in the Wishful Willy case, McGrath would say that the seeming with gold content is 
quasi-inferred from the seeming of a yellowish pebble. Although the seeming of a yellowish 
pebble is justification-conferring (let’s assume), the seeming with gold content fails to justify 
because the quasi-inference isn’t a good one for Willy: it simply involved wishful thinking, 
not the deployment of some recognitional capacity (compare with an analogous case of 
standard inference due to wishful thinking). 
If that’s right, then we would have a nice explanation of our intuitive verdict about the 
Wishful Willy case: the gold seeming fails to justify because it is produced by a bad quasi-
inference from a more basic seeming.  
This proposal could make sense of our verdict about another case (although note that this is a 
cognitive and not a sensory seeming): 
Sloppy Sherlock: Sherlock has the epistemically unjustified belief that Melanie’s 
story about where she was at the time of the murder is a ruse (let’s suppose he makes 
an inexplicable inferential error while listening to her testimony). Given his 
background beliefs about the other suspects and his general expertise in crime 
solving, it seems to him that Melanie is guilty. He forms a belief on the basis of this 
seeming. 
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 McGrath, M. (2013), p. 237 
In this case, I hope the reader will agree that Sherlock’s belief isn’t justified. Relatedly, it 
seems that we should also agree that the seeming that Melanie is guilty cannot confer 
justification for believing that content. This is well explained by the view that the seeming 
about Melanie’s guilt is quasi-inferred from Sherlock’s belief about Melanie’s alibi.  
Are quasi-inferred seemings susceptible to justificatory why-questions? Although I doubt that 
this will convince proponents of P2, I don’t think that it would be odd for someone to ask 
Willy “why does the pebble seem like a piece of gold?” Neither would it be strange for 
someone to challenge Sherlock by asking “why does Melanie seem guilty to you?” 
Furthermore, in response, Willy and Sherlock may appeal to the contents of their more basic 
seemings or other beliefs that they hold. 
Although much more would need to be said,
32
 I think that the possibility of putative cases of 
quasi-inferred seemings provides us with some reason to think that a lack of epistemic 
reasons-responsiveness is not a constitutive part of being a perceptual experience. Hence P2 
doesn’t appear unassailable.  
But maybe the reader rejects this: perhaps there are no non-emotional quasi-inferred 
seemings or perceptual experiences. If so then Sentimentalists might deny P2 by identifying 
emotions themselves as counterexamples. On this view, emotions would be unique kinds of 
perceptual experience that are epistemically reason-responsive.  
Nevertheless, some may be wedded to the standard view of perceptual experience and will 
thus be unimpressed by these attempts to push back against P2. In light of this, I think that the 
Sentimentalist might be best advised to make the following three claims which together 
would enable them to deny P3: (1) Emotions are not genuine perceptual experiences. They 
are simply best understood by analogy with perceptual experience; (2) One way in which 
they differ from genuine perceptual experiences is that they are epistemically reason-
responsive, and, (3) One way in which they are like perceptual experiences is that they can 
play an epistemically generative role.  
                                                          
32
 Even if non-receptive seemings are in some important sense passive, this is still compatible with their being 
epistemically dependent. Many beliefs are – in some sense – passively formed yet are epistemically dependent. 
A similar point could be made if it was thought that non-receptive seemings are in some sense outside subjects’ 
control. Again, it seems possible for subjects to possess beliefs that they can’t get rid of – synchronically or 
diachronically – yet are held for epistemic reasons.  
Indeed, (1) may be the best way to understand the Perceptualist proposal.
33
 Emotions possess 
important features in common with perceptual experience: e.g., they are intentional, non-
doxastic, they possess a phenomenal character, they can conflict with evaluative judgments 
without contradiction, etc. However, they also possess features that make it difficult to 
classify them as genuine perceptual experiences (given the standard view), e.g., they are 
dependent upon our cares and concerns, they are (allegedly) motivational, etc. As (2) claims, 
one further disanalogy on this list may be that emotions, unlike bona fide perceptual 
experiences, are reason-responsive (and recall, I am granting this).
34
  
Now, in order for this to constitute a rejection of P3, it needs to be the case that, despite the 
fact that emotions aren’t perceptual experiences, and despite one of the disanalogies being 
that emotions are reason-responsive, one similarity between perceptual experience and 
emotions – understood as sui generis intentional phenomena – is that emotions are capable of 
playing an epistemically generative role with respect to evaluative beliefs (claim (3)). But 
given the assumption that emotions are epistemically reason-responsive it might be hard to 
see how that could be true. Making good on this response to P3 thus requires responding to 
further reason-responsiveness objections, to which I now turn. 
3. Epistemic Dependence 
The Epistemic Dependence Objection goes as follows: 
P1: Emotions are based upon epistemic reasons. 
P2: If emotions are based upon epistemic reasons then they are epistemically 
dependent sources of epistemic justification. 
P3: If emotions are epistemically dependent sources of epistemic justification then 
emotions do not confer immediate justification. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C: Emotions do not confer immediate justification, i.e., Epistemic Sentimentalism is 
false. 
As before, I’m taking P1 for granted. On the version of Perceptualism that I’m assuming, 
guilt, for instance, could be mediated by a belief that I lied to you, or fear might be mediated 
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 See, e.g., Doring, S.A. and Lutz, A. (2015) ‘Beyond Perceptualism: Introduction to the Special Issue’, 
dialectica 69 (3): 259-270. On p. 260 they say that “in its strong version at least, perceptualism in emotion 
theory has lost lots of its original attraction”, 
34
 Doring and Lutz (2015), p. 265, agree. 
by a perceptual experience of a snake. So, emotions are causally dependent upon cognitive 
bases. It’s plausible that the cognitive bases of emotions are also evidential bases because 
emotions are apparently susceptible to justificatory ‘why?’ questions, and, answers to these 
questions tend to identify features (re)presented in the cognitive base of the emotion. 
Consider the following case: 
Guilty Party: During a conversation with some colleagues at a work Christmas party 
James reveals some intimate details about his partner to them. James knows that his 
partner would be horrified to learn that strangers knew about such private details. 
After the conversation ends, James is overcome with guilt. 
Were someone to ask James why (in the justificatory sense, let’s assume) he was feeling 
guilty, it wouldn’t be unusual for him to reply ‘I broke my partner’s trust.’ This, we might 
think, is good reason to think that James’s emotion is evidentially based upon a 
(re)presentation of this fact, e.g., a belief. However, even if a subject’s attempts at 
demonstrating that they’re justified are not necessarily a good guide to what actually justifies 
a particular mental item (more later), proponents of P1 may think that it’s independently 
plausible that Alex’s belief that he has broken his partner’s trust is the evidential basis for his 
guilt. 
P2 says that if emotions have evidential bases then they are epistemically dependent. 
Minimally, this is the claim that if emotions are based upon a bad evidential base, e.g., an 
unjustified belief, they will fail to confer justification for evaluative beliefs. More strongly, it 
says that emotions can themselves be epistemically (un)justified depending on the justified 
status of their cognitive bases.
35
  
P3 makes the further – seemingly plausible – claim that epistemic dependence entails that a 
particular source of justification is only a source of mediate justification, which is antithetical 
to immediate justification.   
Given the acceptance of P1, Sentimentalists must deny P2 or P3.  
Although P3 is questionable (since epistemic dependence and epistemic mediacy may come 
apart, cf. memory justification) Sentimentalists may attempt to deny P2 in the following way. 
It might be thought that P2 is vulnerable to the fact that states other than beliefs can be 
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cognitive bases of emotions. For example, my perceptual experience of a snake could be the 
cognitive base of fear. Or an imaginative episode wherein I consider pushing someone off a 
bridge to save five people might be the cognitive base of a sort of moral revulsion. This is 
significant because, unlike beliefs, it’s standardly thought that perceptual experiences and 
imaginative episodes can’t be (un)justified, e.g., it apparently doesn’t make sense to say that 
my experience of the snake is justified. Perhaps emotions which take perceptual experiences 
or imaginative episodes as evidential bases aren’t epistemically dependent because they’re 
based on states or processes that are beyond justification (although see §2). 
In response it might be argued that, if the evidential base of one’s emotion is, e.g., an 
experience of a snake, the experience must be justification-conferring in order for the 
emotion to confer justification. This is true, even though perceptual experiences can’t 
themselves be justified. If that’s right, then emotions based on perceptual experience would 




I leave it others to pursue this line of attack on P2. Instead, I propose to grant the soundness 
of the Epistemic Dependency Objection, but deny that this is fatal for Sentimentalism. Let me 
explain.  
Suppose that emotions are epistemically dependent sources of justification. That would seem 
to require that Sentimentalists jettison their view. However, even if emotions are 
epistemically dependent upon their cognitive bases this is compatible with their functioning 




According to this proposal, an emotion, e.g., guilt, would fail to justify an evaluative belief, 
e.g., my having lied to you was wrong, if the cognitive base for this emotion, e.g., a belief that 
I have lied to you, was itself unjustified. This is the sense in which it’s epistemically 
dependent – it requires that the subject have justification for believing non-evaluative 
propositions. However, when the cognitive base of an emotion is justified then emotions can 
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justify beliefs with evaluative content, independently of having further justification for 
believing supporting evaluative propositions. This is the sense in which emotions are 
epistemically fundamental or generative. If that’s right, then emotions being epistemically 
dependent upon their cognitive bases is compatible with their playing the epistemic role that 
Sentimentalists require of them: they sometimes generate evaluative justification.  
On this proposal there is a sense in which emotions are epistemically independent with 
respect to their evaluative content, since emotions don’t require further justification for 
supporting evaluative propositions in order to justify evaluative beliefs. However, if the 
content of emotions links evaluative and non-evaluative contents – e.g., my having lied to 
you was wrong – then emotions are clearly epistemically dependent upon their cognitive 
bases, i.e., they can’t justify evaluative beliefs unless their cognitive bases are justified or 
justification-conferring. Even if emotions have ‘thinner’ non-evaluative content – e.g., what I 
did was wrong – then emotions may still be epistemically dependent upon their bases (yet 
also generative of justification). 
It may help to compare this proposal with Michael Huemer’s account of inferential 
appearances/seemings.
38
 These are non-doxastic, perceptual-like, propositional states which 
allegedly play a key role in inferential (or ‘mediate’) justification. They are distinguished 
from other seeming states, e.g., sensory perceptual seemings, because they (or at least some 
of them) involve or require the exercise of reason or understanding. They are thus labelled 
‘intellectual’ seemings. They are also distinct from other intellectual seemings: intuitions. 
Unlike intuitions, which simply represent the truth of some proposition, inferential 
appearances involve some proposition seeming true to a subject in light of the presumed truth 
of some other proposition. Specifically, inferential appearances “occur during inference and 
represent that a conclusion must be true or is likely to be true in light of something else that 
one believes”39 To illustrate consider the following case. I get home from work and see Jen’s 
shoes. I immediately infer that Jen is probably home. On Huemer’s view what may be going 
on is that I have a belief that Jen’s shoes are in the hall and then undergo an inferential 
appearance that in light of Jen’s shoes being in the hall, Jen is probably home. On this basis I 
form the belief that Jen is probably home. 
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Suppose that there are inferential appearances. There are two similarities between these and 
what I have just said may be true about emotions (remember that I am thinking of the 
perceptual component of emotions as involving an evaluative conceptual seeming state). 
Firstly, Huemer suggests that inferential appearances, e.g., it seems that p, given q, lead to 
doxastically justified beliefs only if the subject has justification for believing the premise(s), 
e.g. q. This epistemic dependence is similar to the relation between the cognitive bases and 
evaluative judgments on the current proposal about emotions. Second, emotional experiences 
might be thought to be experiences in light of their cognitive bases, e.g., in guilt my actions 
(represented in the cognitive base) appear wrong. Are emotions thereby a kind of inferential 
appearance? No. There is a crucial point of disanalogy: inferential appearances are apparently 
not based upon the premises which they are formed in the light of. Instead, an inferential 
appearance “plays an essential role in the process of basing a belief on another belief, because 
it is what constitutes one’s seeing the premise as an adequate ground for the conclusion”40. 
Inferential appearances are not themselves epistemically dependent. This contrasts with 
emotions which, on the current proposal, are epistemically dependent (but also epistemically 
fundamental). 
Instead, on one version of the proposal I’m offering, emotions are (or involve) evaluative 
seemings that are themselves the result of something like a quasi-inference from their 
cognitive base. This quasi-inference may be made against the subject’s background beliefs, 
commitments (some of which may have evaluative content) and character traits. Is this 
compatible with emotions being fundamental sources of justification for evaluative 
propositions? It could be so long as the subject didn’t require justification for believing 
supporting evaluative propositions in order for the quasi-inference to be a good one (and thus 
for the emotion to be justification-conferring). And I suggest that it’s not implausible that this 
is indeed the case. To illustrate: in Guilt Party, James might have the following kinds of 
commitments in light of which he experiences guilt: my partner is deeply important to me, 
my partner doesn’t want strangers to know about aspects of her private life, trust is important 
in a relationship, etc. None of these directly support the proposition that my having revealed 
to strangers private details about my partner was morally wrong. Yet James’ guilt could 
plausibly be justification-conferring with respect to this proposition, in light of the cognitive 
base of the emotion, and given his background commitments. Hence, guilt could be 
epistemically fundamental with respect to this evaluative proposition.  
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Finally, note that the combination of dependence and fundamentality being posited here is not 
without precedent: it is similar to the ontological relation that apparently holds between 
emergent properties and their base properties, e.g., between mental states and physical states 
of the brain. On this view, mental phenomena are ontologically dependent on physical states, 
but are nonetheless ontologically fundamental.
41
 Hence, one way of understanding the current 
proposal about emotional justification is that emotions constitute emergent sources of 
epistemic justification for evaluative propositions.  
How could emotions be epistemically emergent with respect to evaluative propositions? This 
will be because emotions possess epistemically important properties with respect to 
evaluative propositions: either being the outputs of a conditionally reliable process which 
generates veridical experiential outputs given true/veridical non-evaluative evidential bases, 
or possessing something akin to presentational phenomenal character with respect to 
evaluative propositions. Regarding the latter, Phenomenalist option, it might be thought that, 
if emotions really are reason-responsive (as I’m granting), this precludes them from having 
presentational character of the same kind as that allegedly found in sensory experience (since 
one of the features of presentationality, noted earlier, may be a lack of reason-
responsiveness). Although a lot more would need to be said, note two thing in defence: (i) 
presentationality is a condition on immediate justification, but emotions are not here being 
claimed to provide immediate justification, and, (ii) emotions lacking the presentationality of 
sensory experience is compatible with their possessing something similar, e.g., to the subject 
of an emotion it may feel like they are being told that some evaluative proposition is true. Of 
course, if one has serious doubts about the Phenomenalist option, Sentimentalists may instead 
wish to adopt a Reliabilist account. In order to do that, proponents will, however, need to 
address the issue of whether emotions are indeed reliable. But demonstrating how and 
explaining why, e.g., emotions could be reliable, is beyond the scope of this paper.
42
  
Despite these limitations, I take myself to have said enough to show that Sentimentalists 
could accept the soundness of the Epistemic Dependence Objection whilst maintain the spirit 
(though not the letter) of their view. On this proposal, emotions are not sources of immediate 
justification. They don’t halt the epistemic regress tout court. However, this is compatible 
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with emotions functioning as generative sources of justification for evaluative propositions 
and being an empiricist-friendly source of value input. That’s all Sentimentalists need to 
secure the aforementioned attractions of the view.
43
 
4. Why? Questions 
Consider now Why-Question Objections to Sentimentalism
44
 which concern the claims that 
(1) when challenged with why-questions for evaluative judgments subjects don’t (and 
shouldn’t) cite emotions, and, (2) emotions are themselves susceptible to why-questions. Note 
that (1) doesn’t take emotional reason-responsiveness as a premise. I discuss it because my 
response to it connects with my response to the Epistemic Dependence Objection and leads 
on nicely to (2), which does assume epistemic-reason-responsiveness.  
Sentimentalists claim that emotions can (and sometimes do) constitute the epistemic base of 
justified evaluative beliefs. Emotions allegedly function in an epistemically analogous way to 
perceptual experience vis-à-vis empirical beliefs. An alleged sign that perceptual experience 
is the basis for perceptual beliefs is that in response to why-questions regarding these beliefs, 
subjects typically appeal to their experience, e.g., in response to ‘why do you think that the 
ball is green?’ a natural answer is ‘I can see it’. However, the emotional case is apparently 
different: we don’t typically respond to why-questions for evaluative beliefs, e.g., the dog is 
dangerous, by appealing to emotions. It would be unusual to respond to the question ‘why do 
you think that the dog is dangerous?’ by saying ‘because I am afraid’. Not only are these 
responses atypical, they seem like the incorrect thing to say. Instead, when faced with why-
questions regarding evaluative beliefs, we tend to (and should) identify features, objects or 
events that are represented in the cognitive base, e.g., ‘because the dog is rabid’. 
This allegedly provides reason for thinking that emotions aren’t the justificatory basis for 
evaluative judgments. If they were then we would identify emotions when challenged with 
why-questions. But we don’t. Further, the fact that an appeal to one’s emotion would seem 
illegitimate suggests that emotions are insufficient to justify evaluative judgments.  
I present two responses. Firstly, the above data about why-questions is what we should expect 
if emotions are epistemically dependent sources of justification. If challenged on one’s 
evaluative judgment, of which the justificatory basis is an emotion, then it’s unsurprising that 
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subjects appeal to the cognitive basis of their emotion rather than the emotion. For if they 
were to only appeal to the emotion they would still face justificatory questions regarding the 
emotion. Further, Sentimentalists should admit that emotions are not, by themselves, 
sufficient to justify evaluative beliefs: they are, after-all, epistemically dependent. However, 
as I have argued, this is compatible with their being generative sources of evaluative 
justification. Sentimentalists should also claim that it’s compatible with emotions being the 
justificatory base for evaluative beliefs (or at least the partial base): in at least some cases, 
without an emotional response, subjects wouldn’t have (and may not have formed) a justified 
evaluative belief, since it’s the emotion which generates evaluative justification.  
An alternative response is that, when subjects respond to justificatory why-questions about 
their evaluative beliefs, perhaps they are covertly appealing to their emotions rather than 
simply to cognitive bases, i.e., if a subject responds to the question ‘why do you think what 
you did was wrong?’ by claiming ‘I lied to my partner’, this is elliptical for ‘I lied to my 
partner, and my having lied to my partner was wrong’. Sentimentalists could then claim that, 
in at least some instances, subjects are thereby partially appealing to the content of their 
emotion, e.g., my having lied to my partner was wrong. It’s only a partial appeal, because 
they’re also appealing to what justifies the emotion, e.g., the belief that they lied to their 
partner. Far from eschewing emotions when attempting to show that evaluative beliefs are 
justified, subjects sometimes implicitly appeal to them.  
If we implicitly appeal to emotions, one might wonder why it seems illegitimate to defend an 
evaluative judgment, e.g. I did something wrong, with an explicit appeal to emotion, e.g., ‘I 
feel guilty’. Sentimentalists should again highlight the epistemic dependence of emotions: 
appealing to emotion will be insufficient to justify the evaluative belief. An alternative 
explanation is that evaluative discourse is subject to additional norms not operative in non-
evaluative discourse. For example, perhaps in order to be entitled to evaluative beliefs one 
requires evaluative understanding.
45
 When engaged in evaluative discourse perhaps subjects 
ought to offer justifications for beliefs that demonstrate their understanding (at least when 
they are in a position to do so). Appealing explicitly to emotions fails to do this.  
Even if these responses are accepted, it’s possible to develop a second Why Question 
Objection. Suppose that I’m being challenged with a justificatory why-question about my 
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emotion: ‘why are you feeling guilty?’ As suggested, a natural response would identify 
features represented in the cognitive base, e.g., I lied to my partner. However, if this is 
elliptical for the content that my having lied to my partner was wrong (as was suggested 
previously) and if that involves a covert appeal to emotion, then the justification being 
offered for the emotion is circular.  
Moreover, even if identifying the cognitive base of an emotion doesn’t involve a covert 
appeal to the emotion, an interlocutor might challenge the attempt to justify the emotion: 
‘why does your having lied to your partner justify your guilt?’ If one responded by claiming 
‘because lying to my partner was wrong’ it would seem that Sentimentalists are committed to 
claiming that the subject would (at least sometimes) be thereby appealing to their emotion 
(according to Sentimentalists emotions are sometimes the way we register evaluative 
properties). But that is to engage in illegitimate circular justification. 
In attempting to respond to why-questions regarding emotions, subjects may end up engaging 
in illegitimate circular justification. Is that a problem for Sentimentalism? No. Let me 
explain. 
Firstly, we should distinguish between demonstrative and agential justification, i.e., between 
a subject showing that they’re justified and a subject being justified with respect to a mental 
item/proposition.
46
 The fact that some mental item, e, is justified by another item, d, (agential 
justification) doesn’t entail that subjects will appeal to d when challenged about e 
(demonstrative justification), e.g., subjects might be inarticulate. Conversely, the fact that a 
subject appeals to some mental item f, in order to justify, e, doesn’t entail that f is what 
justifies e, e.g., the structure of justification may be unclear to the subject.  
Secondly, the fact that someone fails to give a good demonstrative justification for e, doesn’t 
entail that they’re not justified with respect to e, e.g., I might not be able to provide much if 
anything in the way of a justification for a fundamental arithmetical belief I have, e.g., 
2+2=4, or my belief that the Law of Identity is true. For example, in demonstratively 
justifying the belief in the Law of Identity, I might only be able to give circular justifications.  
Yet that needn’t entail that my belief is unjustified.  
Now apply these points to the emotional case under discussion: that subjects may end up 
engaging in circular justifications when attempting to provide demonstrative justification for 
their emotions would only be a problem for Sentimentalism if (i) demonstrative justification 
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always tracked agential justification (since it would entail that subject’s emotions are 
somehow justified by themselves), and/or, (ii) a failure to provide a good demonstrative 
justification always undermined agential justification (since engaging in dubious circular 
justification would undermine a subject’s justification). But as I just argued, both of these 
claims are problematic.  
Further, the emotional case is plausibly one where demonstrative justification doesn’t track 
agential justification, and where failure to provide demonstrative justification doesn’t 
undermine agential justification. Regarding both of these points recall that emotions are 
fundamental sources of evaluative justification. Emotions are justified by appropriate non-
evaluative cognitive bases. Given this, a legitimate response to ‘why does your having lied to 
your partner justify your guilt?’ is (in a sense) ‘it just does’. But the structure of justification 
may be unclear to subjects. Note also that, because emotions are fundamental sources of 
evaluative justification, it’s unsurprising that, when challenged as to why features identified 
in the cognitive base justify the emotion, some subjects end up engaging in circular 
justification (compare with the Law of Identity case). Note of course that they might not, e.g., 
philosophically trained subjects may appeal to theories. However, Sentimentalists should 
claim that the emotion can confer justification for evaluative beliefs independently of such 
appeals.  
That subjects may sometimes engage in dubious circular demonstrative justifications of 
emotions doesn’t undermine Sentimentalism. In the next section I finally consider an 
objection to Sentimentalism which claims that the view is committed to the claim that 
emotions really do justify themselves, and thus ought to be rejected. 
5. Self-Justification 
Consider, finally, the Self-Justification Objection: 
P1: If emotions can generate justification for reason-responsive mental phenomena, 
e.g., evaluative beliefs, then they could generate justification for themselves. 
P2: Emotions cannot generate justification for themselves. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C: Emotions cannot generate justification for reason-responsive mental phenomena. 
P1 says that, given the assumption that emotions can generate justification, and are 
themselves reason-responsive, an entailment is that emotions are capable of generating 
justification for themselves. P2 claims that ‘self-justification’ is illegitimate. Putting these 
two claims together we appear to be led to the conclusion that emotions cannot generate 
justification, i.e., they are not a fundamental source of justification for reason-responsive 
phenomena like evaluative beliefs. Put another way, the Self-Justification Objection appears 
to entail that the refined version of Sentimentalism – introduced to deal with the Epistemic 
Dependence Objection – is false. 
There are two more specific versions of the Self-Justification Objection. On an Indirect 
version, P1 says that if emotions can generate justification for evaluative beliefs, then the 
evaluative belief could confer propositional justification for (and possibly constitute the base 
of) the emotion. P2 claims that this is illegitimate. On a Direct version, P1 says that simply by 
having a justification-conferring emotion, one gets a justificatory boost (in the propositional 
sense) for that very emotion. P2 claims that this is illegitimate.  
Note that this worry is allegedly particular to emotions. It doesn’t apply to beliefs, since 
although they are reason-responsive, apparently they can only transmit justification for 
propositions from other sources (e.g., perceptions) to other beliefs, rather than generate 
justification in the way that perception does. It doesn’t apply to perceptions, since although 
they’re capable of generating justification they’re apparently not epistemically reason-
responsive (but again see §2 for doubts about that view of perceptual experience). 
How should Sentimentalists respond? Against the Indirect version, Sentimentalist’s should 
claim that the relevant evaluative beliefs can merely preserve the justification from the 
emotion. So the justification they confer for the content of the emotion is no more or less than 
the justification conferred by the emotion. Contra-P1, subjects don’t get an extra justification 
boost for the emotional content over-and-above that which they started with.
47
  
Against the Direct version Sentimentalist’s should also deny P1. Although emotions can 
generate justification for believing their contents (regarding those contents as true) they 
cannot generate justification for themselves. They can preserve justification for their own 
contents, but they cannot provide an evidential boost for emotionally (re)presenting those 
contents.  
This might seem ad hoc. I demur. Sentimentalists can point to cases where one entity has the 
authority to confer some status on another entity, but lacks the authority to do so upon 
                                                          
47
 A more complex version of the Indirect Self-Justification objection would amount to a ‘Bootstrapping’ worry 
of the sort proposed by Vogel, J. (2008), “Epistemic Bootstrapping”. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539. I 
address this in my (2016). Let me simply note that this is an objection which can be brought against any theory 
which allows that experiences can generate justification for beliefs 
themselves. For example, we might think that a judge in a just legal system will have the 
authority to hand down sentences to convicted citizens, but will at the same time lack the 
authority to pass a sentence upon themselves. Notice that it might not simply be a contingent 
matter that things are this way: instead it may be a constitutive part of being that sort of entity 
(a judge in a just legal system) that they can confer a normative status upon other entities, but 
not upon themselves. Or take another example: Catholic priests are able to administer 
confession – which, according to Catholicism, can lead to the forgiveness of sins by God – to 
laypersons and other members of the clergy. However, Catholic priests are not able to 
administer confession to themselves. That is arguably not because of some historical 
anomaly, but because of something about the nature of forgiveness and penance. So, if the 
nature of confession is bound up with the nature of forgiveness, then we might think that it is 
constitutive of being an entity that can administer confession to others that one cannot confer 
God’s forgiveness on oneself. 
Although these examples are by no means strict analogues of the emotional case, their 
purpose is to establish that we are already familiar with cases where claims that are analogous 
to P1 are false, i.e., it is false that if a Catholic priest has the authority to administer 
confession to another person then they have the authority to administer it to themselves. The 
thought then is that this should make it seem less ad hoc to deny P1 of the Self-Justification 
Objection. At least, it seems that the onus is on the proponent of P1 to provide some good 
reason for thinking that it could not be constitutive of a mental item – such as emotion – 
being a generator of epistemic justification, that it can only generate justification for other 
mental items, and not onto itself (even though that mental item is otherwise epistemically 
reason-responsive). Unless they do, Sentimentalism is not undermined. 
6. Conclusion 
Epistemic Sentimentalism can be defended against epistemic reason-responsiveness 
objections, whilst granting that emotions are epistemically reason-responsive. This puts 
Sentimentalists in a dialectically powerful position. However, perhaps emotions are not 
epistemically reason-responsive after-all. Maybe we are confused into thinking this because 
we equivocate between different kinds of normative assessment, i.e., talk of the justification 
of emotion may be tracking a distinct set of norms – e.g., those essential to Neo-
Sentimentalism – easily mistaken for epistemic justification. Considering that proposal is, 
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